Abstract-Semi-quantum key distribution protocols are designed to allow two users to establish a secure secret key when one of the two users is limited to performing certain "classical" operations. There have been several such protocols developed recently, however, due to their reliance on a two-way quantum communication channel (and thus, the attacker's opportunity to interact with the qubit twice), their security analysis is difficult and little is known concerning how secure they are compared to their fully quantum counterparts. In this paper we prove the unconditional security of a particular semi-quantum protocol and derive an expression for its key rate, in the asymptotic scenario.
These protocols rely on a two-way quantum communication channel, allowing a qubit to travel from A to B, then back to A. The all-powerful attacker E, who is sitting between A and B, is able now to attack the qubit twice making the security analysis of these protocols very difficult. Up until now, most work has involved showing the robustness of an SQKD protocol. As defined in [1] , an SQKD protocol is robust if, for any attack that E may perform which potentially causes her to gain information on A or B's raw key, necessarily induces a detectable disturbance.
While several authors have developed SQKD protocols and proven their robustness, only a few authors have considered security of an SQKD protocol beyond robustness (e.g., [2] , [3] ) and none (except for [3] ; however that source involved a mediated SQKD protocol which requires the use of a quantum server) have considered an SQKD protocol's key rate in the asymptotic scenario. Also, no one has yet to consider the maximal amount of noise an SQKD protocol can tolerate before A and B must abort. Though the results in [4] could be used towards this purpose for single state protocols (those where A is limited to only sending the state |+ each iteration), in this paper, we consider the more complicated multi-state protocols where A is not limited in this manner (she may prepare any qubit she likes each iteration, chosen randomly).
In this paper, we will prove, for the first time, the unconditional security of the SQKD protocol from [1] . In particular, we will derive a lower bound on the key rate, based only on certain parameters A and B may estimate, and compute a lower-bound on the protocol's maximally tolerated noise (the amount of noise the protocol can withstand before A and B should abort). We will show the tolerated noise level is comparable to other fully quantum protocols thus providing evidence that security in the semi-quantum setting can be comparable to security in the "fully" quantum setting. Due to length restraints, some details of our proofs are removed. For more detailed proofs (and more background information), we provided an extended version of this paper on arXiv [5] .
For notation, we denote by H(p 1 , · · · , p n ) = − i p i log p i to be the classical Shannon entropy. Given p ∈ [0, 1], we write h(p) to mean H(p, 1 − p). All logarithms are base two, unless otherwise specified.
Let ρ be a density operator acting on some finite dimensional Hilbert space H. Then, we denote by S(ρ) its von Neumann entropy. If ρ AB is a density operator acting on the bipartite space H A ⊗ H B , we will often write S(AB) to denote the von Neumann entropy of ρ AB and S(B) the von Neumann entropy of ρ B where ρ B = tr A ρ AB . We denote by S(A|B) the conditional von Neumann entropy of A's system conditioned on B. That is:
We define the computational Z basis to be those states {|0 , |1 }. We define the Hadamard X basis to be those states
|1 .
I. THE PROTOCOL
The protocol we consider is a semi-quantum one, utilizing a two-way quantum channel, with B being the limited semiquantum or "classical" user. This means that, while A may prepare and measure qubits in any basis of her choice (choosing different bases each iteration of the quantum communication stage), B is limited to performing one of two operations each iteration: he may Measure and Resend the incoming qubit, measuring in the Z = {|0 , |1 } basis and resending the same result back to A (i.e., if he measures |r , for r ∈ {0, 1}, he will send a new qubit of the form |r back to A). Or he may Reflect the incoming qubit, that is, the qubit is ignored by B and simply reflected back to A without otherwise disturbing it, or learning anything about its state.
The SQKD protocol we consider in this paper was the one first presented in [1] . A single iteration of this protocol's quantum communication stage consists of the following procedure:
1) A will prepare and send to B a qubit of the form |0 , |1 , |+ , or |− , choosing one at random. 2) B will choose randomly to either measure and resend or reflect the incoming qubit.
• If he chooses to measure and resend, he will save his measurement result as his raw key bit for this iteration. 3) A will choose to measure in the same basis she originally used to prepare the qubit from step 1 (e.g., if she sent |− on step 1, she will measure in the X basis; if she originally sent |0 she will measure in the Z basis).
After repeating the above process M times, A will inform B, using the public authenticated classical channel, of her preparation basis choice from step 1 (which determines her measurement basis choice in step 3) for each iteration. For each iteration that was performed, B will inform A of his choice to measure and resend, or to reflect. If B measured and resent, and if A chose to prepare (step 1) and measure (step 3) in the Z basis, they will use this iteration for their raw key. In this paper, we will define A's key to be her measurement result from step 3; B's key will of course be his measurement result in step 2. Another option, which we do not use in this paper, would be to define A's key to be her preparation choice in step 1; however in this case, our analysis would be similar.
Note that A may estimate the noise in the X basis using those iterations where she prepared an X basis state and B reflected. Z basis noise may be estimated by divulging a randomly chosen subset of measurement results.
II. SECURITY PROOF
We will first prove security against collective attacks -those where E performs the same attack operation each iteration, but may postpone making a measurement of her ancilla until any future point in time. Later, we will consider security against general attacks.
Let N be the size of A and B's raw key (before error correction) and denote by (N ) ≤ N the size of the secure secret key after privacy amplification (see [6] for information). Then, it was shown in [7] (assuming no pre-processing), that:
The quantity r is called the key-rate of the protocol in the asymptotic scenario. Note that we are using reverse reconciliation in this paper which seems more natural for the protocol in question.
We will compute a lower-bound on the protocol's key rate as a function of the observed error rate. Note that, if r > 0, A and B may distill a secure secret key. Let H T be the two-dimensional Hilbert space modeling the qubit (the transit space) and let H E be E's private ancilla for one iteration of the protocol (without loss of generality, we assume this to be finite). Let (U E , U F ) be a pair of unitary attack operators which both act on H T ⊗ H E . Here, U E will be the attack operator applied in the forward direction (when the qubit initially travels from A to B) while U F will be the attack operator applied in the reverse direction (when the qubit is traveling from B back to A). Without loss of generality, we may assume E's ancilla is cleared to some zero state |0 E and thus we describe the action of these operators as follows:
and:
Here, the |e i and |e k i,j are arbitrary states in H E (not necessarily normalized, nor orthogonal). Of course, the unitarity of U E and U F impose several conditions on these states which will become important later.
Let us now describe the quantum system after a single iteration of the protocol has completed, assuming this iteration is used to contribute to the raw key. In particular, assuming that A sent a Z basis state (either |0 or |1 each chosen with probability 1/2) and that B measured and resent. In this case, the density operator describing B and E's system after A's measurement is: It is important to observe that A and B may estimate the Z basis noise in both the forward channel and the reverse channel, during the parameter estimation stage. In particular, they may estimate the quantity p i,j,k which we use to denote the probability that, if A initially sends |i , then B measures |j , and A measures |k . For example, if there is no noise in the Z basis, it should hold that p 0,0,0 = p 1,1,1 = 1. These parameters can be used to estimate the value e 
A. Bounding S(B|E)
Before continuing, we need a small lemma concerning the von Neumann entropy of a particular form of system. The result is not difficult to show, and the proof can be found in the extended arXiv version of this paper [5] . Lemma 1. Let H = H X ⊗ H Y be a finite dimensional, bipartite Hilbert space and let {|1 X , · · · , |n X } be an orthonormal basis of H X . Consider the density operator: ρ = n j=1 p j |j j| X ⊗ σ j , acting on H, where each σ j is a Hermitian, positive semi-definite operator, of unit trace, acting on H Y . Then:
The above result will be important later. To compute the key rate, we must compute S(B|E) = S(BE) − S(E) using Equation 3. Due to the high-dimensionality of H E , this is difficult and so we will employ a technique similar to one used in [8] , though suitably modified for our purposes: that is, we will condition on a new random variable of our choice, in order to simplify the analysis. Due to the strong sub additivity of von Neumann entropy, it holds that, for any tripartite system H X ⊗H Y ⊗H Z : S(X|Y ) ≥ S(X|Y Z). If we introduce a new system H C into Equation 3, it will hold that: S(B|E) − H(B|A) ≥ S(B|EC) − H(B|A), thus providing us with a lower-bound on the key rate of this protocol.
Let H C be the four dimensional space spanned by {|C, 0 , |C, 1 , |W, 1 , |W, 2 }. We will use the state |C, i C, i| to represent the event that A and B's raw key bits agree/match (that is, they are "correct") and that the qubit sent from A was flipped i times (in the Z basis, which is all we are considering for now as X basis states do not contribute to the raw key and will be considered later). For example, if A sends a |0 , B measures a |1 , and A measures a |1 , this will be the event |C, 1 C, 1|. The states |W, i W, i| are defined similarly, where now A and B's raw key bits do not match (they are "wrong"). (Note that in [8] , the authors only conditioned on the "correct" or "wrong" events which was sufficient in the one-way quantum channel case.)
Incorporating this new system yields the mixed state: Choosing a suitable basis, we may write ρ BEC as a diagonal matrix, where the diagonal entries are elements of the form 
where the arguments in the (Shannon) entropy function above are all p i,j,k from Equation 4. This is a quantity that A and B may compute after parameter estimation.
What remains is to bound S(EC).
Tracing out B from ρ BEC yields:
where σ i are the positive semi-definite operators: Assume, for now, that trσ j > 0 for all j = 1, 2, 3, 4. Let t j = trσ j and defineσ j = σ j /t j . Then we may write ρ EC as:
Eachσ j is a positive semi-definite operator of unit trace. Also, since trρ EC = 1 implies 
We assumed t j > 0 above, however it is not difficult to show that if t j = 0, then σ j = 0. Thus the same arguments above can be used by removing σ j from the density matrix description. In fact our final equation bound does not need this special care. See the arXiv version for more details [5] . , and similarly for the other σ j . Observing that each σ j is a two-dimensional system, we may use the trivial bound S(σ j ) ≤ 1 to show:
If the noise of the quantum channel is low, the values p i,j,k should be low, except for p 0,0,0 and p 1,1,1 which should be high. All that remains, therefore, is to upper bound S(σ 1 ).
Let us first find the eigenvalues of σ 1 (the unnormalized version); the eigenvalues ofσ 1 then will simply be scalar multiples of these. We may write |e 
(we may assume that p 0,0,0 > 0; otherwise, there is too much noise, and A and B will abort). In this {|e , |ζ } basis, we may write σ 1 as:
After some algebra, and using Equation 8, the eigenvalues ofσ 1 , denotedλ + andλ − , are found to be:
and so: S(σ 1 ) = −λ + logλ + −λ − logλ − = h(λ + ), a function which depends on the quantity | e 
, where:
B. Using the X Basis Noise
We will lower bound the value | e 0 0,0 |e 1 1,3 | 2 , by considering the noise in the X basis (note that, thus far, we have considered only the noise in the Z basis). Assume now that A sends an X basis state |+ or |− initially, B chooses to reflect, and A measures in the X basis, thus allowing her to estimate the channel noise in this basis.
In this event, B's operation is essentially the identity operator and, so, if A sends the state |a (either |+ or |− in our case), the state returning to her, after it passed through E twice, is simply |a = V |a , where V = U F U E (the same operators used last section). Using Equations 1 and 2, we may describe V 's action on basis states |0 , |1 ∈ H T as follows (as before, assuming, without loss of generality, that E's ancilla is cleared to the zero state |0 E ):
Since U E and U F are both unitary, so is V = U F U E which implies:
By linearity, we have:
where:
(|g 0 and |g 3 may be defined similarly.)
In this notation, the probability that A measures |− if she originally sent |+ and B reflected, is g 1 |g 1 ; similarly, g 2 |g 2 is the probability that A measures |+ if she originally sent |− . These quantities, which A may estimate in the parameter estimation stage, represent the error E's attack induces in the X basis.
Let p +− be the probability that A measures |− if she sends |+ (assuming B reflected); similarly define p −+ as the probability that A measures |+ if she initially sent |− . Then, using Equations 11, 12, and 13, we have:
Summing these two, expanding, and solving for Re( e Observe that, for any two vectors |x and |y , it holds: |Re( x|y )| ≤ | x|y | ≤ x|x y|y , the first inequality is obvious, the last inequality is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Thus, Re( x|y ) ∈ [− x|x y|y , x|x y|y ].
Using this fact, and Equation 4, yields:
Re( e 0 0,0 |e
Observing that | e 2 is always non-negative, so it makes sense to "cap" B at zero in the event B < 0). Using this, with Equation 10 and the discussion immediately above it, gives us a bound on S(σ 1 ) and thus a bound on the quantity S(EC).
The above proves security against collective attacks. However, after the protocol, A and B may symmetrize their raw key by permuting it using a randomly chosen, and publicly disclosed, permutation. This makes the protocol permutation invariant, in which case, as shown in [9] , [10] , security against collective attacks is sufficient to prove security against any arbitrary general attack. Thus, we have proven this protocol's unconditional security.
D. Examples
Our work above allows A and B to compute the final fraction of secure secret key bits that they can distill after privacy amplification, using only the observed statistics p i,j,k , p +− , and p −+ . Let us now demonstrate our key rate bound on certain examples. In particular, let us assume that E's attack is symmetric in that it can be characterized as follows: 1) Let − → Q denote the probability that if A sends |i initially, B measures |1 − i , for i = 0, 1.
2) Let
← − Q denote the probability that if B sends |i , then A measures |1 − i , for i = 0, 1 (independently of the first channel).
Recall that, so long as r > 0, A and B may distill a secure secret key. We consider nine scenarios, which are summarized in Table I (there we parameterize the error statistics using a single value Q). [5] .
Interestingly, considering the case when − → Q = ← − Q = Q X = Q, even though this protocol cannot withstand as high an error rate as BB84, which maintains a positive key rate for Q = Q X ≤ 11% [7] ; this protocol is comparable to a three state variant of BB84 [11] which can withstand up to 4.25% in this scenario (though, like us, they computed only a lower-bound). It is also not too inferior to B92 which can withstand up to 6.5% error (assuming no preprocessing and a depolarization channel) before the key rate drops to zero [12] . Thus, this proves that even though we are limiting B's capabilities in the semi-quantum setting, we are still capable of tolerating an error rate comparable to "fully" quantum protocols.
III. CLOSING REMARKS
We have proven, for the first time, the unconditional security of a multi-state semi-quantum key distribution protocol. Our bound may not be tight due to our conditioning on the additional random variable C. It might be possible to adapt the technique we used in this paper to the security proof of other SQKD protocols. It would be interesting to compare the key rate bounds of these various protocols. For more details on the proof (along with graphs of Equation 17), the reader is referred to the extended version of this paper on arXiv [5] .
